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Abstract 
The dynamic and flexible nature of memories is evident in our ability to adopt multiple 
visual perspectives. Although autobiographical memories are typically encoded from 
the visual perspective of our own eyes they can be retrieved from the perspective of an 
observer looking at our self. Here, we examined the neural mechanisms of shifting 
visual perspective during long-term memory retrieval and its influence on online and 
subsequent memories using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Participants 
generated specific autobiographical memories from the last five years and rated their 
visual perspective. In a separate fMRI session, they were asked to retrieve the memories 
across three repetitions while maintaining the same visual perspective as their initial 
rating or by shifting to an alternative perspective. Visual perspective shifting during 
autobiographical memory retrieval was supported by a linear decrease in neural 
recruitment across repetitions in the posterior parietal cortices. Additional analyses 
revealed that the precuneus, in particular, contributed to both online and subsequent 
changes in the phenomenology of memories. Our findings show that flexibly shifting 
egocentric perspective during autobiographical memory retrieval is supported by the 
precuneus, and suggest that this manipulation of mental imagery during retrieval has 
consequences for how memories are retrieved and later remembered. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Memories from our personal past are not static, but can be retrieved and thought 
about in multiple ways. This adaptive and flexible characteristic of memories enables us 
to construct alternative visual perspectives from which to view the past, in which we 
shift our first person viewpoint from inside the body to outside the body—seeing 
ourselves within the memory rather than re-experiencing it directly (Nigro and Neisser, 
1983). Moreover, retrieving the past from alternative visual perspectives is not merely 
epiphenomenal, but impacts our sense of self (Sutin and Robins, 2008), affects our 
current mood and future behavior (Holmes et al., 2008; Libby et al., 2007), influences 
our causal attributions (Frank and Gilovich, 1989), and is affected in several mental 
disorders (Kenny et al., 2009). Thus, understanding the mechanisms by which we can 
adopt alternative visual perspectives during memory retrieval has important 
implications for many domains. Here we examine how neural mechanisms that enable 
the construction of alternative versions of the personal past when adopting different 
visual perspectives during memory retrieval shape remembering and subsequent 
memories. 
Visual perspective is a necessary feature in order to retrieve memories as 
remembered events rather than self-knowledge (Rubin and Umanath, 2015). Moreover, 
the particular egocentric perspective adopted during memory retrieval may also 
provide insight regarding the constructive nature of memories (also see McDermott et 
al., 2016). Memories can be retrieved from the visual perspective of our own eyes, as 
most events are initially experienced, as well as from the visual perspective of an 
observer, as if we were seeing ourselves in the memory. If remembering was like 
pressing play on a movie, the observer perspective would be like watching the star in 
the movie as a member of the audience, whereas the own eyes perspective would be 
like experiencing the movie as the main star. Recent autobiographical memories are 
more frequently associated with spontaneously adopting an own eyes perspective, 
whereas remote memories are associated with an observer perspective (e.g., Nigro and 
Neisser, 1983; Rice and Rubin, 2009). This consistent pattern of results is thought to 
reflect the natural transformation of memories overtime (Butler et al., 2016), because 
memories are not usually formed from an observer perspective (but see Bergouignan et 
al., 2014; Cardena and Spiegel, 1993; Ozer and Weiss, 2004). Actively shifting visual 
perspective from an own eyes to an observer perspective during memory retrieval has 
also been shown to affect the content and phenomenological characteristics of retrieval. 
For example, adopting an observer visual perspective during retrieval reduces the 
emotional intensity of memories (Berntsen and Rubin, 2006; Robinson and Swanson, 
1993), possibly due to increased detachment or distance from the remembered event 
(but see Libby and Eibach, 2011). Moreover, these changes in memories as the result of 
shifting visual perspective during retrieval at one point in time can also contribute to 
persistent changes in subsequent memories (Sekiguchi and Nonaka, 2014). A number of 
functional neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that memory retrieval is an active 
process that can modify memories (Bridge and Paller, 2012; Gershman et al., 2013; St 
Jacques et al., 2013b), which supports memory theories that emphasize the critical role 
of reactivation in shaping the brain networks that contribute to long-term memory 
representations (Mcclelland et al., 1995; Winocur and Moscovitch, 2011). Manipulating 
visual perspective during memory retrieval could provide an experimentally tractable 
way to investigate constructive neural mechanisms that potentially shape 
autobiographical memories in both the short and long-term.  
Adopting a particular visual perspective critically depends upon egocentric 
representations in the posterior parietal cortex (Aguirre and D'Esposito, 1999; 
Ciaramelli et al., 2010; Wilson et al., 2005), and has been linked in particular to the 
precuneus (for reviews see Byrne et al., 2007; Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). As the so-called ǲmind’s eyeǳ (Fletcher et al., 1995), the precuneus has long been associated with 
mental imagery processes during memory retrieval, as well as visuospatial imagery and 
self-referential processes (for review see Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). A rich literature 
has demonstrated that the precuneus also supports the ability to imagine alternative 
visual perspectives (Jackson et al., 2006; Vogeley et al., 2004; for review see Van 
Overwalle and Baetens, 2009) and to navigate in space (Ghaem et al., 1997; Spiers and 
Maguire, 2006; for review see Boccia et al., 2014), perhaps reflecting a more general 
ability to orient the internal representation of the self with the external world (Peer et 
al., 2015).  According to a prominent neural model of spatial memory and imagery, 
egocentric frameworks generated during retrieval from long-term memory within the 
precuneus can be manipulated and updated when people imagine the possible 
movements they can make within the remembered scene (Byrne et al., 2007). 
Supporting this model, a number of recent studies have shown that the precuneus 
contributes to the ability to update internal representations of the world when 
imagining changes in self-location in space (Dhindsa et al., 2014; Lambrey et al., 2012; 
Sulpizio et al., 2016; Wolbers et al., 2008).  
Much less is known about how visual perspective influences the neural 
mechanisms of long-term episodic memory retrieval, including autobiographical 
memories. Autobiographical memory retrieval is supported by a network of brain 
regions that encompasses lateral and medial parietal cortices, including the precuneus 
(Cabeza and St Jacques, 2007; Fuentemilla et al., 2014; Spreng et al., 2008; Svoboda et 
al., 2006). Generating and elaborating upon vivid mental images during 
autobiographical memory retrieval has been linked to the precuneus (Daselaar et al., 
2008; Fuentemilla et al., 2014; Gardini et al., 2006; Söderlund et al., 2012), and 
recruitment of this region also contributes to the ability to construct a complex and 
realistic scene of the personal past (Hassabis et al., 2007; Summerfield et al., 2009). In a 
structural MRI study, Freton and colleagues (2014) found that the volume of grey 
matter in the precuneus was positively related to the spontaneous retrieval of 
autobiographical memories from an own eyes perspective, but the rating scale they 
used precluded examining whether a similar relationship held for memories 
spontaneously retrieved from an observer perspective (e.g., Rice and Rubin, 2009). The 
couple of neuroimaging studies that directly examined how adopting an own eyes or 
observer visual perspective influences memory retrieval have also found inconsistent 
results concerning the involvement of the precuneus. In a recent fMRI study, Grol, 
Vingerhoets and De Raedt (2017) found that neural recruitment of the precuneus was 
greater when adopting an observer compared to an own eyes perspective during 
autobiographical memory retrieval. In contrast, Eich and colleagues (2009) found that 
the precuneus was similarly involved when retrieving memories for complex lab-based 
events from own eyes and observer perspectives. These inconsistent findings with 
respect to the precuneus involvement, when adopting a particular egocentric 
perspective during memory retrieval, could reflect different demands on perspective 
shifting processes (Wolbers et al., 2008). Here we hypothesize that during 
autobiographical memory retrieval shifting visual perspective involves the 
manipulation of egocentric mental images in the precuneus.  
Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) we examined the neural 
mechanisms that support the ability to retrieve alternative versions of the personal past 
and to shape online and subsequent memories by manipulating whether participants 
adopted a dominant or alternative visual perspective during memory retrieval. In an 
initial session, participants generated a large number of autobiographical memories and 
provided subjective ratings on the degree to which memories were spontaneously 
retrieved from own eyes and observer perspectives (see Figure 1). We then selected a 
subset of memories that were strongly associated with a spontaneous own eyes 
perspective, which allowed us to control for the initial perspective of memories in order 
to more effectively manipulate visual perspective shifting during fMRI scanning.  We 
manipulated the degree of visual perspective shifting during fMRI scanning by asking 
participants to retrieve memories either from the alternative (i.e., observer perspective) 
or the same (i.e., own eyes) visual perspective as originally reported, thus requiring a 
shift in perspective or no shift, respectively across study sessions. A repetition 
suppression approach was employed here to compare the linear decrease in the blood 
oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response across the two perspective conditions (Grill-
Spector et al., 2006). Participants were asked to retrieve memories across three 
identical repetitions and we examined repetition suppression, or the decrease in the 
BOLD response, from the first to the third repetition. We predicted that in both 
egocentric conditions repeated retrieval of memories would result in reductions in 
neural recruitment across the memory retrieval network in line with repetition 
suppression effects observed in similar tasks (Szpunar et al., 2014; van Mulukom et al., 
2013). However, we hypothesized that shifting visual perspective during memory 
retrieval likely requires additional processes that enable egocentric perspectives to be 
updated during long-term memory retrieval (e.g., Byrne et al., 2007). In particular, we 
predicted that precuneus would show a linear decrease with repetitions when shifting 
visual perspective during retrieval, reflecting decreased engagement of egocentric 
updating mechanisms with successive repetitions of memories from an alternative 
visual perspective. We then examined how this neural signature of egocentric updating 
during memory retrieval contributed to online and subsequent changes in the 
phenomenology of memories, where we predicted greater subsequent changes due to 
shifting perspective compared to maintaining the same perspective.   
 Figure 1. Experimental design. During session 1 participants generated specific 
autobiographical memories from the past 5 years and rated the degree of own eyes and 
observer perspective on 7-point scales from 1 = low to 7 = high. Only memories 
associated with a strong own eyes perspective (i.e., >= 5 on the own eyes rating, and < 4 
on the observer rating) were included in session 2 and 3. One week later during session 
2 participants were asked to retrieve some of these memories from either an own eyes 
or an observer perspective while undergoing fMRI scanning. In the non-shifted 
perspective condition the strong own eyes memories were retrieved again from the 
same own eyes perspective, whereas in the shifted perspective condition memories 
were retrieved from the alternative observer perspective. Participants then rated the 
ability to maintain the indicated perspective and the emotional intensity associated 
with retrieval. Two days after scanning in session 3 participants were asked to retrieve 
all the memories again, including memories in a baseline condition without additional 
retrieval experience during scanning, and to rate the visual perspective associated with 
retrieval.  
 
1.2. Material and Methods 
1.2.1. Participants 
Participants were aged 18 – 30 years. All participants were right-handed, 
reported no history of neurological or psychiatric episodes or current use of medication 
known to affect cognitive function. Participants gave written consent for a protocol 
approved by the Harvard University Intuitional Review Board. In total, 37 participants 
(24 women; Mean Age in Years = 22.3, SD = 3.3) gave written informed consent. Three 
participants were excluded due to an inability to retrieve a sufficient number of strong 
own eyes memories (for further details see Procedure). Additionally, four participants 
were excluded from the fMRI analysis because of excessive movement during scanning 
(i.e., maximum absolute movements greater than 2 mm, more than 5 movements 
greater than 0.5 mm, and/or a slice signal-to-noise ratio less than 99). Thus, the results 
were based on 29 participants (20 women, Mean Age in Years = 22.6, SD = 3.2). 
1.2.3. Procedure 
The study took place across three separate sessions. In session 1, participants 
were provided with a list of possible events to help generate 240 autobiographical 
memories from the last five years that were specific to time and place. They were asked 
to provide a unique title, specific date, and subjective ratings of emotional intensity, 
reliving, own eyes perspective, observer perspective, and rehearsal (all on 7-point 
scales from 1 = low to 7 = high). Thus, participants generated memories and then rated 
the degree to which memories were retrieved from their own eyes and from an 
observer visual perspective, where their first person viewpoint is centred outside of the 
body.  In line with previous findings (Rice and Rubin, 2009), approximately 72% (SD = 
18%) of memories were spontaneously retrieved from an own eyes perspective, as 
indicated by higher ratings of own eyes perspective (>=5) coupled with lower ratings of 
observer perspective (< 4). We controlled for the initial perspective of memories by 
selecting this subset of memories strongly associated with an own eyes perspective and 
96 of these memories, hence forth referred to as own eyes memories, were randomly 
selected for all further sessions. These own eyes memories were then assigned to three 
separate conditions that were matched in terms of the phenomenological ratings.  Thus, 
there were no initial differences in the phenomenological ratings of memories within 
each condition. 
In session 2, one week later participants were asked to retrieve these own eyes 
memories while taking either the perspective of their own eyes or the perspective of an observer. Specifically, participants were instructed: ǲIf the perspective is own eyes, 
mentally reinstate your memory for the event as if seeing it again through your own 
eyes. If the perspective is observer, mentally reinstate your memory for the event as if 
viewing it from the perspective of a spectator or observer, watching yourself in the remembered event.ǳ Thus, in the non-shifted perspective condition, memories were 
retrieved again from the same own eyes perspective, whereas in the shifted perspective 
condition memories were retrieved from the alternative visual perspective of an 
observer. Prior to fMRI scanning, participants were first trained on the task and any 
questions about the visual perspective conditions were addressed. During fMRI 
scanning, participants were shown titles of 64 of the own eyes memories and they were 
asked to retrieve them while taking either the perspective of their own eyes or the 
perspective of an observer (see Figure 1). Participants had 7.5 s to retrieve the memory 
from the indicated perspective and then were given 2.5 s each to rate the amount of 
emotional intensity and how well they were able to maintain the perspective indicated 
(on 5-point scales from 1 = low to 5=high), the order of which was counterbalanced 
across participants. The timing of the task was based on a previous study that examined 
retrieval and manipulation of autobiographical information (Szpunar et al., 2014), and 
we conducted further pilot testing to ensure that participants had sufficient time for 
memory retrieval.  In order to examine repetition suppression effects, participants were 
asked to retrieve each memory three times within the shifted and non-shifted 
conditions. Memory repetitions took place within each of 6 functional runs for a total of 
42 (run 1) or 30 (run 2 – 6) trials in each run. Run 1 was longer than the other runs due 
to practical issues related to separating the 64 memories equally across the runs.  There 
were two counterbalanced randomized sequences of the repetitions of trials for each 
functional run, such that memories were repeated every 2 to 6 trials. For each 
repetition participants were instructed to retrieve the memory in the same way from 
the indicated visual perspective. Trials were separated by an active baseline consisting 
of left/right decisions equally spaced across a variable length (2.5 – 10 s; e.g., Stark and 
Squire, 2001), distributed exponentially such that shorter inter-trial intervals occurred 
more frequently than longer.  
In session 3, two days later, we investigated the influence of visual perspective 
shifting on subsequent memory. Participants were asked to retrieve the 64 own eyes 
memories that had been retrieved during scanning, along with 32 baseline memories 
that had not been retrieved during session 2. No instructions were provided regarding 
visual perspective. Thus, similar to session 1, in this final session we examined again the 
spontaneous perspective that participants adopted during memory retrieval. They were 
asked to rate the extent to which memory retrieval was associated with an own eyes 
and an observer perspective, emotional intensity, and reliving, all on 7-point scales (1 = 
low to 7 = high). 
1.2.4. fMRI Data Acquisition and Pre-Processing 
Imaging was conducted on a 3T Siemens Magnetom TimTrio Scanner, equipped 
with a 12-channel head coil at the Center for Brain Science at Harvard University. A 
laptop computer running Eprime 1.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburg, 
PA) controlled stimulus display via an LCD projector, which projected onto a screen 
placed at the head of the MRI bore. Participants viewed the screen through a mirror 
fastened to the head coil. Cushions were used to minimize head movement and earplugs 
dampened scanner noise. Participants made responses using a five-button box placed in 
their right hand. 
Anatomical images were acquired using a high-resolution three-dimensional 
magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo sequence (MPRAGE; 176 sagittal slices, 
echo time (TE) = 1.64 ms, repetition time (TR) = 2,530 ms, flip angle = 7 degrees, voxel 
size = 1 x 1 x 1 mm). Functional images were collected using a T2* gradient echo, echo-
planar imaging (EPI) sequence sensitive to blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) 
contrast (TR = 2,500 ms, TE = 25 ms, flip angle = 85 degrees, 3 x 3 mm in-plane 
resolution). Whole-brain coverage was obtained with 41 contiguous slices, acquired in 
the oblique coronal orientation. An online correction for distortion in the EPI images 
was conducted by acquiring two EPI images pre-scan with phase-encoding gradients in 
opposite directions and then computing a displacement map correcting the distortion in 
each voxel. Following the functional runs, we included a 6 min 12 sec resting state scan 
in which participants were asked to keep their eyes open while fixating on a crosshair 
as part of our standard protocol for an analysis that was not the focus of the current 
study. 
Imaging data were preprocessed and statistically analyzed using SPM8 
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). First, data were 
preprocessed to remove sources of noise and artifact. Preprocessing included slice-time 
correction to correct for differences in acquisition time between slices for each whole 
brain volume; realignment within and across runs to correct for head movement; 
spatial normalization to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template (resampled 
at 2 x 2 x 2 mm voxels); and spatial smoothin  at 8 mm full width at half maximum 
(FWHM) using a Gaussian kernel. 
1.2.5. Behavioral Analysis 
Behavioral analyses were conducted using repeated measures ANOVAs. To 
determine online changes in memories due to perspective shifting, we calculated a 2 
(Condition: Shifted Perspective, Non-Shifted Perspective) x 3 (Repetition: First, Second, 
Third) repeated measures ANOVA separately on emotional intensity and perspective 
maintenance ratings, and response times to make each rating. To determine subsequent 
changes in the subjective ratings of memories due to perspective shifting, we calculated 
a 3 (Condition: Shifted Perspective, Non-Shifted Perspective, Baseline) x 2 (Study 
Session: One, Three) repeated measures ANOVA separately on emotional intensity, 
reliving, own eyes, and observer ratings. We used the Greenhouse-Geisser correction to adjust the degrees of freedom when Mauchly’s test of sphericity was violated. 
1.2.6. fMRI Analysis 
Fixed effects analyses included regressors at the onset of each retrieval cue in 
each perspective condition with a duration of 7.5 s that were modelled with a canonical 
hemodynamic response function (hrf). An additional regressor of no interest was 
included at the onset of the first rating with a duration of 5 s (i.e., the total length of the 
two ratings) and collapsed across both the perspective and repetition conditions, thus 
allowing us to effectively separate the hrf of the ratings from the retrieval periods of 
interest. A flexible factorial model, including repetition (first, second, third) and 
perspective condition (shifted, non-shifted), was used to examine random effects. We 
computed a linear contrast, First>Second>Third retrieval trials (c = [1 0 -1]), in order to 
examine the decrease in neural recruitment across the three repetitions of each 
memory (e.g.,van Mulukom et al., 2013). The repeated retrieval design allowed us to 
isolate neural regions that contribute more generally to retrieval and those that reflect 
differences due to updating egocentric perspective, by comparing the linear reduction 
in the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response across repetitions in the shifted 
and non-shifted conditions. We used a conjunction approach to isolate common 
retrieval-related regions and a subtraction analysis to reveal differences in the non-
shifted and shifted perspective conditions. A whole-brain analysis with a primary voxel-
level threshold of P = .001 and a minimum cluster-extent threshold of k ≥ ͸ͳ voxels was 
used to correct for multiple comparisons at p < .05 as determined by 10000 Monte Carlo 
simulations (Slotnick et al., 2003). To minimize potential false positives with using 
cluster thresholding we incorporated the correct smoothing value (i.e. derived from the 
average FWHM value calculated from the group-analysis in SPM) and used a 
conservative primary voxel-level threshold (Eklund et al., 2016; Woo et al., 2014). 
1.2.7. Linear-Mixed Effects Approach 
We conducted an additional general linear model to examine the influence of 
neural recruitment on behavioral ratings by taking a linear mixed-effects approach 
(Chen et al., 2013). One of the benefits of using this particular approach is that it 
provides a way to examine variability across individual memories while also accounting 
for the fact that memories are clustered within participants. In contrast, standard 
analysis approaches would typically remove variability by aggregating data across 
individual memories and by doing so they target the level of the individual rather than 
the level of the memory (for further discussion see Wright, 1998).   
The same onsets and durations were used as above, except separate regressors 
were calculated for each retrieval trial (64 memories x 3 repetitions = 192 total 
regressors). Average beta values within 6mm spheres centered on the peak voxels 
identified from the main analysis above were then extracted for each retrieval trial in 
each participant. We then examined how neural recruitment (either BOLD response on 
each trial or repetition suppression effects) predicted behavior (perspective 
maintenance, emotional intensity, or pre-versus-post-retrieval changes in visual 
perspective; for further details see Results) while accounting for the clustering of 
retrieval trials within subjects, differences in the average neural recruitment of ROIs 
across participants (i.e., inclusion of a random intercept), and potential differences 
among participants in the relationship between neural recruitment and behavior (i.e., 
inclusion of a random slope). The linear mixed-effects model contained two levels, as 
follows: 
Level 1: Yij = β0j + β1j*(PerspectiveConditionij) + β2j*(BOLDij – meanBOLDj) 
+ rij 
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + u0j 
β1j  = γ10 
β2j = γ20 
At level 1, the model is expressed such that behavior (Yij) on each trial is a linear 
combination of the intercept for each participant (β0j), the influence of perspective 
condition β1j*(PerspectiveConditionij), the influence of BOLD response in the ROI 
(β1j*(BOLDij  - meanBOLDj)), and the random error (rij) associated with the each 
retrieval trial (i) in each participant (j). The mean BOLD response was grand mean 
centered across participants for better interpretation of the parameter estimates in the 
model (Kreft and others 1995). At level 2, the participant level intercepts (β0j) are 
reflected by the sum of the overall mean (γ00) and random deviations from the mean 
(u0j) for each participant. In a maximal random effect model, we initially allowed the 
slopes of the predictors to vary across participants, but including these parameters 
decreased the fit of some of the models (as indicated by a >2 increase in AIC values) and 
we did not find a significant effect of variance in the slopes. Thus, here we report 
models in which the within-trial slope of the perspective condition and BOLD response 
predictors were fixed (i.e., they do not vary across participants) and thus both have a 
variance equal to zero. Incorporating level 2 into level 1 provides the full multilevel 
model: 
Yij = γ00 + γ10*(PerspectiveConditionij) + γ20*(BOLDij – meanBOLDj) + u0j + 
rij 
The fixed part of the model includes the overall intercept (γ00) and level 1 
predictors for the perspective condition (γ10*(PerspectiveConditionij)) and the BOLD 
response (γ20*(BOLDij – meanBOLDj)), whereas the random part contains the variation 
in participant intercepts (u0j) and within participant residual effect (rij). We also tested 
for the interaction of perspective condition and neural recruitment. All models were 
estimated using REML, separately for each ROI. A similar linear-mixed effects 
regression analysis was used to examine the influence of behavioral responses during 
retrieval on long-term changes in memories. Instead of using the BOLD responses as 
predictors, however, we examined how mean centered values of perspective 
maintenance and emotional intensity ratings predicted changes in visual perspective as 
the result of retrieval experience. 
In order to determine the validity of the linear mixed-effects approach, we 
estimated the proportion of the total variance that occurs for retrieval trials clustered 
within participants. Across each of our models, approximately 20% of the variance in 
behavior was accounted for by this clustering. Thus, use of the linear mixed-effects 
model was deemed to be necessary for analyzing these effects. Effect sizes for the linear 
mixed-effects models were calculated by dividing the beta coefficient values by the 
standard deviations. 
1.3. Results 
1.3.1. Behavioral Results 
The manipulation of visual perspective during memory retrieval affected 
subjective ratings of perspective maintenance in session 2. There was a main effect of 
condition on perspective maintenance ratings during fMRI scanning in session 2, F 
(1,28) = 21.69, p = .00007, ηp2 = .44, reflecting a greater decrease in the shifted 
compared to the non-shifted perspective conditions (for means and SD see Table 1).1 
However, there was no main effect of repetition, F (2, 56) = .53, p = .59, ηp2 = .02, or an 
                                                        
1 Nonparametric analysis, as available, were also conducted on the subjective rating data and produced a 
similar pattern of results here and elsewhere. 
interaction between condition and repetition, F (2, 56) = .87, p = .42, ηp2 = .03. Response 
times to make perspective maintenance ratings were also slower overall in the shifted 
compared to the non-shifted perspective conditions, F (1, 28) = 4.32, p = .047, ηp 2 = .13, 
but this effect was primarily driven by slower response times on the first retrieval trial 
(p = .007) as reflected by a condition x repetition interaction, F (2, 56) = 4.06, p = .023, 
ηp2 = .13. Thus, is was more difficult to maintain a shifted than a non-shifted perspective 
during memory retrieval, but additional retrieval attempts did not generally increase 
the subjective ease with which memories were retrieved from the indicated perspective.  
Table 1. Online Ratings during fMRI Scanning in Session 2 
  
Non-Shifted 
Perspective   Shifted Perspective   
  
1st 
Trial 
2nd 
Trial 
3rd 
Trial   
1st 
Trial 
2nd 
Trial 
3rd 
Trial   
Perspective 
Maintenance                 
Mean Rating 4.15 4.20 4.19   3.59 3.62 3.58   
SD 0.44 0.43 0.45   0.63 0.70 0.68   
              
  
Mean RT (ms) 933.88 960.67 958.03   997.42 964.94 988.96   
SD 198.10 203.61 210.23   209.75 230.84 228.03   
                
  
Emotional Intensity                 
Mean Rating 3.05 2.96 2.90   2.87 2.75 2.66   
SD 0.64 0.68 0.69   0.66 0.70 0.70   
                
  
Mean RT (ms) 
1003.8
5 951.23 934.27   
1075.7
1 985.99 979.74   
SD 201.01 184.26 190.04   237.32 191.06 192.21   
 
Not surprisingly, there were no initial differences in subjective ratings among the 
conditions in session 1 because we equated memories on these qualities in each 
participant before assigning them to the conditions (for means and SD see Table 2). We 
examined changes in the phenomenology of memories due to perspective shifting 
during memory retrieval in two ways. First, we examined how shifting perspective 
contributed to online changes in the subjective ratings of emotional intensity during 
fMRI scanning in session 2. We found that shifting visual perspective during retrieval 
reduced subjective ratings of emotional intensity when compared to maintaining the 
same visual perspective, as reflected by a main effect of condition, F (1,28) = 18.22, p 
= .0002, ηp2 = .39 (see Figure 2A), and slower rating responses in the shifted perspective 
condition, F (1, 28) = 7.91, p = .009, ηp2 = .22. There was also an overall linear decrease 
in emotional intensity ratings with repetition, F (2,56) = 18.31, p = .00002, ηp2 = .40, 
coupled with faster response times, F (1.376, 56) = 9.36, p = .002, ηp2 = .25. However, 
there was no interaction between repetition and condition on emotional intensity 
ratings, F (2,56) = 1.67, p = .20, ηp2 = .06. Thus, memories retrieved from the shifted 
perspective continued to be experienced with less emotional intensity on every 
repetition when compared to the non-shifted perspective condition.  
 Figure 2. Behavioral results. (A) Emotional intensity ratings indicated a significant 
reduction in the shifted perspective condition compared to the non-shifted perspective 
condition, revealing that perspective shifting during retrieval leads to online memory 
changes. (B) The overall difference in visual perspective ratings from session 1 to 
session 3 indicated that there were more long-term memory changes in the shifted 
perspective condition compared to the non-shifted perspective or baseline conditions. 
(C) A linear mixed-effects regression model (see Online Methods) revealed that 
perspective maintenance ratings made during memory retrieval in Session 2 
significantly predicted the amount of long-term memory changes (i.e., the difference in 
visual perspective from session 1 to session 3), but differently in each perspective 
condition. (D) A separate linear mixed-effects regression model revealed that emotional 
intensity ratings during memory retrieval in session 2 also significantly predicted the 
amount of long-term memory changes (i.e., the difference in visual perspective from 
session 1 to session 3), but differently in each perspective condition. Predicted values of 
the difference in visual perspective from the regression model are plotted on the y-axis 
and grand mean centered values of perspective maintenance (C) or emotional intensity 
(D) ratings are plotted on the x-axis. Each regression line indicates a separate 
participant with a variable intercept, and the markers on each line represent values for 
individual memories. Error bars indicate ± standard error. 
 
Second, we examined how shifting perspective during retrieval biases 
subsequent memories by comparing subjective ratings made before retrieval (i.e., 
during session 1) and after retrieval (i.e., during session 3). We found that there were 
significant differences in the overall visual perspective that participants spontaneously 
adopted during memory retrieval (calculated as the difference between observer and 
own eyes ratings), F (2, 56) = 11.12, p = .00009, ηp2 = .28 (see Figure 2B). Pairwise 
follow-up comparisons revealed that this significant main effect of condition was 
reflected by greater changes in the shifted perspective compared to non-shifted 
perspective, p = .003, and baseline condition, p = .0002, but no differences between the 
non-shifted perspective and baseline conditions, p = .57. Further inspection revealed 
that the change in visual perspective from session 1 to session 3 was due to significant 
differences between the conditions in both the own eyes perspective ratings, F (2, 56) = 
8.58, p = .001, ηp2 = .24, and observer perspective ratings, F (2, 56) = 12.29, p = .00004, 
ηp2 = .31. Follow-up pairwise comparisons showed the expected decreases in the own 
eyes ratings and increases in observer ratings between the shifted and non-shifted 
conditions, as well as the shifted and baseline conditions (all p’s < .ͲͲͲͳ). Perspective 
shifting did not influence pre- versus post-retrieval changes in subjective ratings of 
reliving or emotional intensity. However, there was an overall reduction in emotional 
intensity across the study conditions, F (2,56) = 4.15, p = .02, ηp2 = .13, which was 
reflected by greater reductions in the both shifted and non-shifted conditions compared 
to baseline (p’s < .Ͳͷ). Thus, shifting visual perspective during retrieval biased the 
egocentric perspective people adopted when subsequently remembering. 
Table 2. Behavioral Results from Session 1 & 3 
  Non-Shifted Shifted 
Baseline 
  Perspective Perspective 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Session 1             
Remoteness (days) 417.04 134.02 421.38 145.39 432.09 138.02 
Reliving 4.77 0.86 4.78 0.86 4.79 0.88 
Emotional Intensity 3.77 0.87 3.77 0.89 3.81 0.90 
Own Eyes Rating 6.16 0.46 6.14 0.49 6.16 0.45 
Observer Rating 1.70 0.40 1.70 0.39 1.68 0.43 
Rehearsal 2.67 0.73 2.67 0.76 2.69 0.72 
    
  
  
  
  
  
Session 3             
Reliving 4.51 0.98 4.42 1.02 4.56 1.00 
Emotional Intensity 3.70 0.86 3.68 0.95 3.93 0.96 
Own Eyes Rating 5.52 0.75 5.20 0.83 5.57 0.67 
Observer Rating 2.65 1.08 2.98 1.14 2.62 1.05 
              
Session 3 - Session 1             
Reliving -0.26 0.74 -0.35 0.84 -0.23 0.78 
Emotional Intensity -0.07 0.60 -0.09 0.82 0.12 0.73 
Own Eyes Rating -0.63 0.74 -0.94 0.75 -0.58 0.59 
Observer Rating 0.95 0.93 1.30 0.91 0.93 0.85 
 
Critically, long-term changes in memories due to perspective shifting were also 
predicted by retrieval experience in session 2 (see Figure 2C & 2D).  First, we found that 
subjective ratings of perspective maintenance during retrieval predicted the degree of 
long-term changes in perspective differently in each retrieval condition, β = .87, SE = .16, 
p < .0001, d = .13. In the non-shifted condition, higher ratings of perspective 
maintenance during retrieval protected memories from subsequent changes in 
perspective, β = -.62, SE = .13, p < .0001, d = .11, whereas, in the shifted condition, higher 
perspective maintenance ratings contributed to greater subsequent changes in the 
perspective of memories, β = .25, SE = .11, p = .019, d = .06. Second, we found that 
subjective ratings of emotional intensity during retrieval also contributed to long-term 
changes in perspective differently in each condition, β = .25, SE = .11, p = .037, d = .05. 
There was no influence of emotional intensity on perspective changes in the non-shifted 
perspective condition, β = .01, SE = .09, p = .893. In contrast, in the shifted perspective 
condition reductions in emotional intensity during retrieval predicted greater changes 
in the perspective of subsequent memories, β = -.23, SE = .09, p = .014, d = .06. In sum, 
the behavioral results provide strong evidence that shifting perspective during retrieval 
contributes to long-term changes in how memories are subsequently remembered, 
above and beyond the effects of verbatim retrieval alone or due to changes in memories 
over time.  
1.3.2. fMRI Repetition Suppression Effects Contributing to Perspective Shifting 
Figure 3. Common regions supporting memory retrieval as revealed by a 
conjunction of the repetition suppression findings in the non-shifted and shifted 
perspective conditions. 
The main goal of the fMRI analysis was to determine neural mechanisms during 
retrieval that contribute to perspective shifting and their impact on memories. To 
achieve this goal, we compared the linear trend in the reduction in the BOLD response 
in the shifted perspective and non-shifted perspective conditions. As expected, we 
found robust common repetition suppression effects across the perspective conditions 
in a number of regions including lateral and medial prefrontal cortices, lateral temporal 
lobes, medial temporal lobes (including the hippocampus and parahippocampal 
cortices), parietal cortices, and posterior midline regions across both studies (see 
Figure 3), which overlaps with default and other networks that are frequently engaged 
during autobiographical memory retrieval (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; St Jacques et al., 
2013a). Thus, these regions support retrieval-related processes irrespective of the 
degree of perspective shifting required, perhaps reflecting the fluency or ease of 
reactivating memories with repetition.  
In contrast, examining the difference between the perspective conditions 
revealed greater repetition suppression effects in other neural regions when shifting 
perspective compared to the non-shifted condition.  There was a greater linear 
reduction in the BOLD response in the shifted perspective condition in both the central 
portion of the precuneus and right angular gyrus (see Figure 4), suggesting that these 
regions contributed to processes that enabled the ability to adopt an alternative visual 
perspective during memory retrieval. Moreover, linking these findings directly to 
behavior, in both central precuneus, β = .05, SE = .01, p = .0001, d = .05, and angular 
gyrus, β = .08, SE = .02, p = .00005, d = .06, neural recruitment on each trial predicted 
the ability to maintain the indicated perspective during retrieval. Repetition 
suppression effects were also found in bilateral prefrontal cortex, however, the 
influence of this region on the ability to maintain a particular perspective was more 
complex (see Figure S1). There were no reliable effects of right PFC on perspective 
maintenance ratings. However, within the left PFC there was a significant interaction 
between condition and BOLD response, β = .22, SE = .07, p = .001, d = .05, such that 
greater recruitment of this region was associated with a better ability to maintain 
perspective in the non-shifted condition, β = .16, SE = .05, p = .001, d = .05, but not in the 
shifted condition β = -.06, SE = .05, p = .23. The differential relationship between left PFC 
recruitment and behavior across the conditions suggests that control processes that 
support perspective ability may become less effective with increasing demands to shift 
perspective. There were no regions that showed greater repetition suppression effects 
in the non-shifted compared to the shifted perspective condition. The differences in 
repetition suppression effects between the conditions support our predictions 
regarding the important role of posterior parietal cortices, in particular central 
precuneus and right angular gyrus, in adopting an alternative visual perspective during 
memory retrieval.  
 Figure 4. fMRI repetition suppression effects contributing to perspective shifting. There 
were greater repetition suppression effects (i.e., reduction in percent signal changes 
from the 1st to the 3rd retrieval trial) in both the central precuneus and right angular 
gyrus, indicating that neuronal populations in these regions are associated with 
perspective shifting.  Error bars indicate ± standard error. MNI = Montreal Neurological 
Institute Coordinates. 
 
1.3.3. fMRI Effects of Perspective Shifting on Memories 
A central aim was to investigate how neural mechanisms that support shifts in 
visual perspective during memory retrieval also contribute to the potential modification 
of memories. To assess the involvement of central precuneus and right angular gyrus in 
online and subsequent changes in memories we conducted two additional analyses. 
First, we examined whether the degree of perspective shifting undertaken during 
retrieval, as reflected by the amount of repetition suppression, was associated with 
online changes in the emotional intensity of memories. We found that the amount of 
repetition suppression in the precuneus for individual memories (i.e., difference in 
BOLD response for first versus third repetition in each memory) predicted changes in 
emotional intensity across the retrieval trials depending upon the particular 
perspective condition, β = .08, SE = .03, p = .011.  In the shifted perspective condition, β 
= -.06, SE = .02, p = .011, d = .06, but not the non-shifted perspective condition, β = .02, 
SE = .02, p = .30, repetition suppression in the central precuneus predicted greater 
reductions in emotional intensity during retrieval (see Figure 4A). In contrast, 
repetition suppression in the angular gyrus did not predict changes in emotional 
intensity, β = -.03, SE = .03, p = .37. Thus, greater involvement of the central precuneus 
when adopting an alternative perspective shifting contributed to online changes in 
memories during retrieval. 
 Figure 5. Neural predictors of online and long-term memory changes. (A) A linear 
mixed-effects regression model revealed that the amount of repetition suppression (i.e., 
difference in BOLD response from the first to the third retrieval trial) in the central 
precuneus predicted the degree of online changes in memories, as reflected by the 
reduction in emotional intensity across repetitions of individual memories during 
retrieval in session 2, differently in each perspective condition. (B) A separate linear 
mixed-effects regression model revealed that the amount of repetition suppression in 
the central precuneus also predicted greater differences in long-term changes in 
memories, as reflected by differences in visual perspective from session 1 to session 3, 
equally in both conditions. For visualization purposes, the predicted values of the 
difference in emotional intensity (A) or the difference in visual perspective (B) from 
each regression model are plotted on the y-axis and grand mean centered values of the 
repetition suppression BOLD response are plotted on the x-axis. Each regression line 
indicates a separate participant with a variable intercept, and the markers on each line 
represent values for individual memories.  
 
Second, we examined whether repetition suppression effects also predicted 
long-term changes in subsequent memory as reflected by the change in visual 
perspective of memories from session 1 to session 3 (i.e., pre- vs. post-retrieval). We 
found that greater repetition suppression in the precuneus predicted changes in 
perspective from session 1 to session 3 equally across both perspective conditions (see 
Figure 4B), β = .11, SE = .05, p = .019, d = .06. Thus, the degree of perspective shifting 
involved during retrieval contributed to persistent changes in the visual perspective of 
memories. In contrast, and similar to the results observed above, repetition suppression 
in the angular gyrus did not predict long-term changes in perspective, β = .03, SE = .08, p 
= .68. Together these findings reveal that the central precuneus supports the ability to 
adopt a particular egocentric perspective, as well as to update it, consistent with our 
prediction that perspective shifts during retrieval bias how memories are remembered 
online and in the future.  
1.4 Discussion 
Our findings reveal that neural mechanisms that support the ability to take 
alternative visual perspectives during retrieval contribute to biases in how memories 
are subsequently remembered. Computational models of spatial memory and imagery 
predict that egocentric frameworks generated during retrieval from long-term memory 
are represented and updated during imagined egocentric movements in space (Byrne et 
al., 2007). Using a repeated retrieval fMRI design, our results provide evidence that the 
online restructuring of egocentric frameworks that occurs with shifts in visual 
perspective during retrieval is also retained in subsequent memories. We found that 
shifting from a dominant to an alternative visual perspective during retrieval of 
autobiographical memories was supported primarily by posterior parietal cortices.  
Importantly, the extent of repetition suppression in the precuneus predicted both 
online and subsequent changes in memories. 
Perspective shifting led to greater linear reductions across repetitions in 
posterior parietal cortex, including the precuneus and right angular gyrus. As a ǲspecialized nexusǳ the precuneus supports the interaction between frontoparietal and 
default networks according to task demands (Utevsky et al., 2014), and is thus well 
situated to support goal directed retrieval processes (Spreng et al., 2010). The 
involvement of the precuneus in episodic memory retrieval has been primarily 
attributed to mental imagery processes, but this region has also been linked to other 
processes such as visuospatial and self-referential tasks (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). 
One common denominator may be its role in visual perspective taking. Via its functional 
connections with the angular gyrus (Margulies et al., 2009) the precuneus may provide 
an egocentric filter from which to inspect incoming information from long-term 
memory (Cabeza et al., 2008; Committeri et al., 2015). This viewpoint is in line with the 
parietal window hypothesis, which holds that a population of neurons in posterior 
parietal cortices, particularly the precuneus, represents the locations of recalled 
landmarks from an egocentric viewpoint and manipulates these mental images in the 
service of planning and navigation (Byrne et al., 2007). For example, Wolbers and 
colleagues (2008) found that the precuneus supported the manipulation of egocentric 
representations resulting from navigation in space during the perception of object 
locations. Our findings converge with this research, and extend it by suggesting that the 
manipulation of mental images in the precuneus when updating egocentric perspectives 
also shapes long-term memory retrieval.  
Another possible explanation of the findings is that decreased involvement of the 
precuneus reflects more general differences in difficulty across repetitions in the shifted 
compared to the non-shifted perspective conditions. This idea is in line with previous 
research suggesting that precuneus may be modulated by task difficulty (e.g., Gilbert et 
al., 2012; Leech et al., 2011). However, in the current study we found that maintaining 
an alternative perspective was subjectively judged to be equally difficult across 
repetitions of retrieval trials. Thus, repetition suppression effects in the precuneus 
cannot be readily explained by the more general accounts of decreases in the difficulty 
of shifting visual perspective with repetition. Moreover, we found that recruitment of 
precuneus predicted trial-by-trial variation in the success of maintaining a particular 
visual perspective—irrespective of whether memory retrieval involved a shift or no 
shift in perspective. Thus, a more parsimonious account is that precuneus modulates 
processes that support egocentric perspective taking, which are engaged more when 
memory retrieval involves shifting from a dominant to an alternative visual perspective 
compared to maintaining a dominant visual perspective.  
Shifting visual perspective in autobiographical memories modified the subjective 
experience of memory retrieval online, and continued to affect subsequent memories 
even when perspective was not directly manipulated. In line with the previous 
literature (e.g., Berntsen and Rubin, 2006; Robinson and Swanson, 1993), we found that 
shifting visual perspective from an own eyes to an observer perspective reduced 
emotional intensity during retrieval for memories that were initially rated equally. 
Moreover, the amount of reduction in emotional intensity across repeated retrieval 
trials was predicted by the amount of repetition suppression in precuneus, suggesting 
that egocentric processes that support perspective shifting contributed to these 
behavioral differences. Shifting visual perspective during retrieval also led to 
subsequent changes in the visual perspective of memories—biasing spontaneous 
retrieval from an observer perspective for memories that were originally retrieved from 
a strong own eyes perspective. The behavioral and neural signatures of perspective 
shifting during retrieval also predicted the amount of overall changes in visual 
perspective demonstrating that the pattern of findings cannot easily be explained by 
demand characteristics (also see McIsaac and Eich, 2004). Similar effects of perspective 
shifting during retrieval on subsequent memories were not found for emotional 
intensity ratings, as has been sometimes shown (Sekiguchi and Nonaka, 2014). One 
possible explanation is that the influence of shifting perspective on long-term changes 
in emotional intensity is modulated by the emotional intensity of memories. In the 
current study we did not elicit particularly emotional memories, and, coupled with the 
unusually large number of autobiographical memories generated, this may have led to 
generally lower levels of emotional intensity. At any rate, our findings suggest that 
shifting visual perspective can modify some of the phenomenological properties of 
memories. It is of interest for future research to determine whether shifts in visual 
perspective contribute to modification in other properties of memories, such as the 
accuracy or the type of details recalled.  
We focused on shifts in visual perspective in one direction only: from own eyes 
to observer. Since the recent memories used here were more strongly associated with 
an own eyes perspective (i.e., approximately 72% of memories initially generated) this 
approach allowed us to robustly test the prediction that shifting from a dominant to an 
alternative visual perspective would modify memories. This idea is in line with current 
assumptions regarding the nature of observer perspective in memories, which suggest 
that it reflects a transformation of memories overtime due to constructive memory 
processes (e.g., Butler et al., 2016; McDermott et al., 2016). Additionally, previous 
research suggests that shifting from an observer to an own eyes visual perspective may 
not confer the same changes in the phenomenology of memory retrieval as we found 
here. For example, some studies have shown that shifting from an observer to an own 
eyes perspective does not lead to a similar increase in emotional intensity as the 
decreases typically found with the reverse perspective shift (Berntsen and Rubin, 2006; 
Robinson and Swanson, 1993; Sekiguchi and Nonaka, 2014). These asymmetrical effects 
of visual perspective shifting may reflect a fundamental difference in the nature of 
memories associated with a dominant observer perspective or on the egocentric 
processes that operate on such memories. We also note that there are many practical 
issues with testing shifts in visual perspective from a dominant observer perspective to 
an alternative own eyes perspective in autobiographical memories in fMRI studies. For 
example, strong own eyes and strong observer memories will likely differ in memory 
remoteness and frequency, which makes it difficult to compare a sufficient number of 
equivalent memories.  
Despite these issues, understanding the generalizability of precuneus 
involvement in reverse shifts in visual perspective during memory retrieval and its 
effects on memories will be important avenue for future research. Given the flexibility of 
the precuneus response during visual perspective taking, it is likely that it would 
supports shifts in visual perspective irrespective of the direction- especially for equally 
strong own eyes and observer memories. Understanding these issues could also help to 
explain the mixed findings noted earlier regarding the preferential response of the 
precuneus when contrasting own eyes and observer perspectives during 
autobiographical memory retrieval (Eich et al., 2009; Freton et al., 2014; Grol et al., 
2017). One important step in this direction will be to control for the initial visual 
perspective of memories, as well as differences in demands on perspective shifting. 
Rather than contributing to the ability to adopt one egocentric perspective versus 
another during memory retrieval, the precuneus likely supports processes that enable 
us to inspect and manipulate the mental images that arise during remembering, thereby 
providing an egocentric window onto the past. 
In contrast to the posterior parietal cortices, a number of other regions showed 
common repetition suppression effects. These included many of the regions typically 
recruited during autobiographical memory retrieval (Cabeza and St Jacques, 2007; 
Fuentemilla et al., 2014; Spreng et al., 2008; Svoboda et al., 2006), including the medial 
temporal lobe (hippocampus and parahippocampus), lateral temporal lobe, some 
regions of the lateral prefrontal cortex, anterior midline and posterior midline regions 
excluding the precuneus. Surprisingly, previous fMRI studies of autobiographical 
memory retrieval have not controlled for the visual perspective of memories, or have 
focused solely on memories retrieved from an own eyes perspective (but see Grol et al., 
2017). These considerations may explain why precuneus is not frequently recruited 
during autobiographical memory retrieval (Svoboda et al., 2006), perhaps reflecting 
differential demands on perspective shifting. 
Interestingly, the hippocampus also showed common repetition suppression 
effects across the perspective conditions suggesting that modification of memories in 
the current study was operating primarily on egocentric rather than allocentric (i.e., 
world-centred frame of reference) representations. Egocentric-related updating 
processes that occurred during retrieval may have contributed to greater fluency when 
later translating from allocentric to egocentric frameworks, biasing the reinstatement of 
similar visual perspectives in the future rather than updating allocentric memory 
representations (Ekstrom et al., 2014). Although the hippocampus is critical during the 
formation of novel allocentric representations of space it is less involved when 
navigating in familiar environments (Moscovitch et al., 2006), and modification of 
allocentric representations in the hippocampus during retrieval also depends upon the 
degree of updating required (Byrne et al., 2007). Thus, greater demands on allocentric 
representations of space during perspective shifting within long-term memory may lead 
to greater involvement of the hippocampus. 
Our findings contribute to the growing literature on retrieval-related 
mechanisms that support adaptive memory updating processes (Schacter et al., 2011). 
Theories of memory emphasize the critical role of reactivation on the distributed brain 
networks that support long-term memory representations (Mcclelland et al., 1995; 
Winocur and Moscovitch, 2011). Memory reactivation, or the activation of latent 
memory trace during retrieval, contributes to updating in memories when new 
information is introduced (Hupbach et al., 2007). Here we show that during memory 
retrieval shifting visual perspective also signals the presence of new information 
possibly contributing to reactivation-related changes in memories. In previous work we 
showed that the quality of memory reactivation modulated the extent of subsequent 
changes in memories (St Jacques et al., 2013b). In the current study we controlled for 
initial differences in the quality of memory reactivation by selecting memories that 
were associated with equivalent levels of reliving, thus, allowing us to target how shifts 
in visual perspective during retrieval shapes memories. We showed that shifting 
perspective during retrieval updated the visual perspective of subsequent memories—
ultimately biasing the preferred spontaneous visual perspective of memories. This 
distortion of visual perspective in memories due to explicit retrieval, along with offline 
reactivation during periods of sleep and awake rest (Oudiette et al., 2013), could 
contribute to the natural transformation of visual perspective from own eyes to 
observer perspectives as memories become more remote (Butler et al., 2016). An 
important question for future research will be to determine whether the transformation 
of memories due to perspective shifting can be reversed (Butler et al., 2016).  
1.5. Conclusions 
By manipulating whether people adopted a dominant or alternative visual 
perspective in autobiographical memories, we showed that shifting visual perspective 
during retrieval shapes remembering and is supported by neural recruitment in 
posterior parietal cortices. In particular, precuneus contributed to online reductions in 
emotional intensity, as well as the distortion of visual perspective in subsequent 
memories. We suggest that the manipulation of mental images in precuneus when 
shifting visual perspective during autobiographical memory retrieval can shape and 
potentially restructure how we remember. 
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Highlights 
 Memories are shaped by retrieval from alternative egocentric frameworks  Posterior parietal cortices underlie shifts in visual perspective during memory 
retrieval  Precuneus predicts online and subsequent changes in memories due to perspective 
shifting 
 
